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The
Electoral Fortunes

of
Gubernatorial Incumbents:
1947-1981

Mark E. Tompkins
University of South Carolina
I break down gubernatorial electoral outcomes into expected vote and short-term changes,
using an intrastate baseline measure. Employing these measures, I find evidence of period
effects in the role played by incumbency, including the growth in its importance in the last
decade. Incumbents' gains are most notable in first reelection contest, but tail off in subsequent races. Moreover, these advantages are more pronounced after a two-year term than
after a four-year term. Other factors influencing incumbents' success are less clear in their
impact: Sabato's measure of reputation is associated with electoral gains, but increasing state
bureaucratization appears more weakly linked.

A olitical scientists are showing increasing interest in the electoral impact of incumbency. Legislative scholars have led the way, spurred by
the claim that the number of vulnerable members of Congress has been
declining. Initial efforts to explain incumbency's impact focused on
systemic forces, such as reapportionment (Erikson, 1972a; Tufte, 1975),
but more recent analyses have moved to consider specific resources
employed by congressional incumbents, such as the frank, and the nature
of their reelection contest (most notably, the strength of the challenge
they confront).1
* An earlier version of this paper was delivered at the 1982 Southern Political Science
Association meeting in Atlanta, Georgia. I am grateful for very helpful comments and suggestions from Thad Beyle, John Hibbing, David R. Mayhew, Larry Sabato, Robert Savage,
Jesse White, and David Whiteman. Nonetheless, I remain personally responsible for the
analysis and its conclusions.
1
For examples, see Cover and Brumberg, 1982; Mann and Wolfinger, 1980; Abramowitz, 1980: Hinckley, 1980a, 1980b; Cover, 1977; and Mayhew, 1974; in an exception to these
studies examining the many resources of incumbents, Alford and Hibbing, 1981, rule out
generational explanations.
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Curiously, the focus on the institution-specific advantages of incumbency has led to the neglect of other political officeholders.2 Perhaps
more important, this focus neglects some important paradoxes. On the
one hand, senatorial incumbents are often viewed as less secure than
House incumbents, apparently because of the relative visibility of the offices and the respective strength of the challenges mounted against them
(Abramowitz, 1980, p. 634). Governors, who are even more visible than
senators and whose reelection efforts are surely also subject to strongly
mounted challenges, should then be even more vulnerable. Hinckley
offers data suggesting that senatorial incumbents were more secure than
gubernatorial incumbents in the 1948-66 period (1970, pp. 840-41) and,
indeed, that incumbency appears to offer no advantage for governors.
Based on related findings, Seroka (1980) attributes differences between
senatorial and gubernatorial success to political executives' particular
vulnerability to the impulse to "throw the rascals out." (One of President
Ford's aides offered this statement of the conventional wisdom, "People
forget what you have done for them and remember only what you did to
them" [Cronin, 1980, p. 45].) On the other hand, governors appear to be
far safer than senators in recent years. For example, Morehouse (1981)
shows only four of thirty-five Democratic incumbents losing between
1970 and 1979 and attributes greater Republican losses to Watergate,
while Patterson (1982) finds that incumbency makes a positive contribution to vote shares in 1978 gubernatorial elections.
The dominant view is that states' elections are increasingly competitive
while gubernatorial incumbents appear to be increasingly secure. The
exception occurs in the occasional election where state contests are
submerged in a larger floodtide of reaction to outside events, such as
Watergate or Reaganomics. Still, some controversy apparently remains
unresolved: Piereson argues that "incumbency is a growing advantage"
(1977, p. 956) to governors, while Turett suggests that "between 60 and
70 percent of all incumbents do less well in their bids for reelection"
(1971, p. 118).
Governors appear to offer an ideal focus for an analysis of the benefits
of incumbency. States form partially autonomous jurisdictions which
have distinctive characteristics, affording incumbents different oppor2

Fiorina, 1977a, 1977b, offers one exception to the institution-specific focus, suggesting
another (not inconsistent) explanation for the role played by incumbency, arguing that the
growth of the public sector produces increasing resources which can be used on behalf of an
incumbent. This model has been formally elaborated more recently by Fiorina and Noll,
1978. On the latter point, for example, there are relatively few studies on the advantages of
gubernatorial incumbency. Turett, 1971; Cowart, 1973; Piereson, 1977; Seroka, 1980;
Morehouse, 1981; Patterson, 1982; and portions of Hinckley, 1970, are the notable exceptions.
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tunities for political achievement. As political executives, governors provide us with an opportunity to examine the differences between legislative
and executive experience. This may be important, since governors are
well known (what evidence is available suggests they are far better known
than legislators [see, for example, Sabato, 1978, p. 8]) and are probably
far more vulnerable than legislators to being held responsible for the
course of events within their constituency. (Indeed, organizational
theorists sometimes argue that executives are held responsible for their
organizations, as symbols, irrespective of their personal role—a point to
which we will return below [for one such statement, see Pfeffer and
Salancik, 1978, chap. 9, particularly p. 236].)
Any analysis of this problem must begin by resolving some of the apparent controversy over the impact of gubernatorial incumbency. This
controversy is created in part by analytic differences among the various
studies of gubernatorial incumbency, with three characteristics appearing
particularly important: (1) The several available works rely on different
methods ranging from success rates (Morehouse), simple vote shares
(Seroka), and victory margins (Turett), to attempts to establish partisanship within the state as a prior expectation against which particular elections can be assessed (Piereson, 1977; and Patterson, 1982). (Limited
survey evidence is also offered by Cowart, 1973.) Ultimately, a method
consistent with this last goal but more sensitive to interstate and interelection differences will be proposed and used; it will support the development of additional evidence about secular influences on gubernatorial
fortunes. (2) These studies focus on different time periods: Turett's work
concludes with the 1969 elections, Piereson's with those in 1970, while
Seroka's evidence extends through 1976, and Patterson's work is based on
the 1978 elections. Some of the different conclusions, perhaps, arise from
period effects as a result. (3) Some studies, notably Turett's, examine
limited groups of states (he includes nineteen), excluding others in an effort to focus on "competitive" elections. Since the effects of method,
period, and scope may confound the discussion, each needs to be examined in a systematic analysis of the impact of gubernatorial incumbency.
THE IMPACT OF INCUMBENCY

Gubernatorial terms of office substantially limited the number of incumbents seeking reelection until recent years. For this reason and
others, Sabato has argued that a modern governorship emerges after
World War II. Accordingly, an analysis of gubernatorial incumbency
can be usefully focused on the postwar era, concentrating on this modern
governorship and avoiding conclusions based on the limited number of
states permitting incumbents to run for another term in earlier periods.
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We can begin by looking at gubernatorial election outcomes, considered
over three periods: 1947-59, 1960-69, and 1970-81.3 To examine the
benefits of incumbency, the fortunes of incumbents can be compared with
those of successor candidates (those seeking an open seat vacated by a
member of their own party). Table 1 uses the simplest measures
available — the proportion of the votes cast for candidates of either
party — reporting both overall averages and the proportion of cases within
various categories of competition. The latter can be used to assess the
claim that average results are influenced by the relative proportions of
competitive and noncompetitive elections.
Examining the distribution of cases, scope decisions appear to be particularly important for the first period, where there are a substantial
number of one-sided victories by Democratic successor candidates (most
occur in the South). The importance of these candidacies had declined
by the 1960s, however, as Democratic incumbents became more successful and fewer Democratic successor candidates won essentially uncontested elections. Systematic analysis of vote-share categories remains
difficult in any event.
Turning to the average vote proportions, the evidence suggests that
both Turett and Piereson are correct, to a point. As Turett suggests, incumbents did appear to do worse than successor candidates of their party
in the earlier periods which he examined (extending through the second
period included here). On the other hand, as Piereson suggests, incumbency does appear to be a "growing advantage," particularly in the
most recent decade (which he did not examine). In fact, by the third
period included in table 1, incumbency appears to offer a noteworthy advantage in the electoral area, with incumbents' vote totals averaging 6
and 7 percent higher for Democrats and Republicans respectively, than
successor candidates' totals.
Turett used another approach in assessing incumbents' advantages: examining the proportion of incumbents losing ground in their margins of
victory. This has the benefit of comparing the relative performance of an
incumbent in the actual electoral contest. This standard suggests that
fewer incumbents seeking reelection (thus excluding incumbents seeking
their first full term) have lost ground in their margins of victory in the
most recent period, 1970-81 (53.2 percent), compared to the earlier
3

There are two other advantages to this focus: it avoids confounding incumbency with the
impact of the realignment period of the Great Depression; and it allows us to use a data set
reported in Sabato, 1978, which essentially begins after World War II. The analysis treats
three periods; the first two incorporate the separation of the 1960s from earlier periods common to many of these studies, while the last period provides a separate update for the work
concluding in 1969 or 1970.
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TABLE 1
VOTE SHARES OF GUBERNATORIAL CANDIDATES

PART ONE:

FOR SUCCESSORS SEEKING AN OPEN SEAT (SUCCESSOR'S SHARE OF ALL VOTES —
PERCENT)

1947-59

1960-69

1970-81

(PARTY AFFILIATION OF PREVIOUS GOVERNOR)
DEM.

Average % Cast for
Candidate
Share of Votes
Less than 50%
50% to 55%
55% to 60%
60% to 65%
65% to 90%
More than 90%
Totals
(N)
PART TWO:

REP.

DEM.

REP.

DEM.

REP.

70

52

56

50

53

44

16
16
12
6
26
24
100

37
33
12
9
9
0
100

43
22
12
10
6
6
99

47
24
29
0
0
0
100

44
24
11
7
13
0
99

84
4
12
0
0
0
100

(50)

(43)

(49)

(17)

(45)

(25)

FOR INCUMBENTS SEEKING REELECTION (INCUMBENT'S SHARE OF ALL VOTES —
PERCENT)
(INCUMBENT'S PARTY AFFILIATION)

Average % Cast for
Candidate
Share of Votes
Less than 50%
50% to 55%
55% to 60%
60% to 65%
65% to 90%
More than 90%
Totals
(N)

DEM.

REP.

DEM.

61

54

56

53

59

51

28
20
20
4
6
99

28
33
16
16
7
0
100

33
24
16
8
18
2
99

34
37
16
13
0
0
100

17
28
15
17
21
2
99

43
24
24
7
2
0
100

(54)

(61)

(51)

(38)

(53)

(42)

. 22

REP.

DEM.

REP.

Note: Percentage totals reflect the impact of rounding; two elections involving independents are excluded; three elections where governors of one party are succeeded by
governors of the other party, in midterm, are also excluded.

periods, where 67.0 percent lost ground in the 1960-69 period, and 64.9
percent lost ground in the 1947-59 period.4 Still, the apparent decline in
4
The selection process limiting analysis to nineteen states may be objectionable on other
grounds, but it makes little difference here. For example, in the states he examines, Turett
reports 62.8 percent losing ground in 1960-69, and 68.0 percent losing ground from 1950-59
(1971, p. 119). Using only his nineteen states, 53.7 percent of the incumbents lose ground
from 1970-81.
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incumbents losing support may be a trivial finding, since a number of
cases involve differences of less than one percent. Accordingly, we need a
more sensitive measure to overcome these limitations.
As with most analyses of congressional incumbents' safety, each of the
approaches considered thus far ignores (or at least oversimplifies) the impact of systematic constituency differences. Perhaps incumbents run in
districts in which candidates from their party are expected to fare better
(or worse) than those of the other party.5 Closely contested districts,
after all, may produce more close contests and more incumbent defeats
than other, safer districts where an incumbent wins and holds a seat for
many terms. Framed in this perspective, the issue must be resolved by
examining the fortunes of a party's candidates compared to their expected
performance; do incumbents do better than expected, for that constituency? Once the issue is posed in these terms, we can then also ask what
factors are associated with the relative success of incumbents in improving
on this baseline. It is this path which Cowart (1973) and Patterson (1982)
have adopted; unfortunately, their work is limited to a few elections.
In appendix 1, a more general approach to the measurement of this expected vote is reported. Briefly, it involves the calculation of a seasonally
adjusted (for presidential year surges in participation), twelve-year
backcast, moving average of previous gubernatorial election results,
which yields a measure of the expected vote for a gubernatorial candidate
for each state in each election, based on previous gubernatorial elections
in that state (rather than national elections occurring in the state, as
Piereson, 1977, uses) . 6 The difference between this expected vote and the
actual vote can be treated as a measure of the short-term change from an
expected result — the question then becomes "are incumbents doing better
than we might otherwise expect?" Turett's simpler standard can also be
compared more systematically by looking at the mean victory margins
rather than simply at proportions improving their margins and proportions lowering theirs.
In table 2, the power of incumbency is assessed against these two standards, margins of victory and short-term changes from the expected vote,
examining them within the three time periods employed in table 1. The
unexplored conjecture guiding Turett's strategy of selecting competitive
5

This limitation in incumbency analyses focused on the House of Representatives is
understandable, since constituency boundaries change in a substantial number of the competitive districts through redistricting. Stable state boundaries, on the other hand, allow us
to incorporate constituency differences into gubernatorial analyses.
6
This is an important change. A measure employing several contests from the same or
contiguous years incorporates national, transient influences into factors influencing the
measure of expected vote; this appears inconsistent with our understanding of a normal vote.
It also confounds sometimes distinctive national contests with those focused on state issues.
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TABLE 2
AVERAGE GUBERNATORIAL MARGINS OF VICTORY
AND SHORT-TERM CHANGES IN VOTE
INCUMBENTS AND SUCCESSORS SEEKING AN OPEN SEAT
GUBERNATORIAL ELECTIONS: 1947-81
VICTORY MARGIN (%)
N o ELECTIONS EXCLUDED
SUCCESSORS
INCUMBENTS

1947-59
(N)
1960-69
(N)
1970-81
(N)

29.579
(93)
16.707
(66)
14.262
(70)

18.911
(115)
13.675
(89)
17.869
(95)

CONTESTED ELECTIONS
INCUMBENTS

SUCCESSORS

19.467
(81)
12.801
(63)
14.262
(70)

16.972
(112)
12.694
(88)
16.995
(94)

SHORT-TERM CHANCE IN VOTE (%)

1947-59
(N)
1960-69
(N)
1970-81
(N)

-3.079
(81)
-5.209
(66)
-4.246
(70)

-.565
(115)
1.598
(89)
3.702
(95)

-3.585
(81)
-5.605
(63)
-4.246
(70)

-.551
(112)
1.449
(88)
3.523
(94)

states can also be examined by removing those states where the election is
essentially uncontested (as indicated by the victor obtaining more than 90
percent of the votes).
Table 2 suggests that average margins of victory are declining
somewhat. This decline appears particularly strong in the last period
studied by Turett (essentially the second period here); in the more recent
decade, it has tapered off (and reversed direction, mildly, in both incumbents' and contested successors' elections). More important, it suggests that incumbents used to achieve narrower margins of victory than
successor candidates (partly, but not entirely due to the consideration of
uncontested elections), but that relationship had been reversed by the
third period studied here. Particularly when uncontested elections are
excluded, the 1960s emerge as a pivotal decade, as has been found with
congressional incumbency (Alford and Hibbing, 1981).
Examining incumbents' performance assessed against a measure of the
expected vote, we see a different story which helps account for the findings reported by Turett. Short-term changes in votes are on average
negative, reflecting the widely noted trend toward more competitive elections. Turett's finding, which indicates declines in incumbents' margins
(saying nothing about others), reflects, in part, the overall secular trend

ELECTORAL FORTUNES OF GUBERNATORIAL INCUMBENTS

527

toward more competitive elections. Incumbents' relative performance
(compared to their expected vote) has been stronger than that of successor
candidates throughout the period, but in recent years incumbents have
been able to improve on the expected vote rather than simply minimize
their losses. At the same time, successor candidates are doing no better
(indeed, a bit worse) than they were twenty years ago. This elaborates
Piereson's general finding that "incumbency is a growing advantage"
(1977, p. 956), as well as extends it by another decade. Apart from this,
we can see that the expected vote measure removes the skewing influence
of noncompetitive elections, allowing us to incorporate them into the
overall analysis without changing the results.
As a result, many of the puzzles about the impact of incumbency appear resolved. Throughout the period studied, incumbents did better
than successors. In the 1950s, this relative advantage allowed them to
resist the tendency toward more competitive elections, to some degree; in
the 1970s, incumbents were able to improve on the baseline expectation
established in the recent past, while successor candidates often lost
ground. Once again, we confront the incumbency puzzle, to be addressed in a new setting. What factors produce the advantage gubernatorial incumbents enjoy?
COMPETING EXPLANATIONS?

The incumbency effect identified here closely parallels the related finding from legislative studies. It appears to have grown during the same
time period, and it appears to be comparable in magnitude, although different methods preclude direct comparisons. Accordingly, both conventional wisdom and this related legislative literature shape our efforts to
account for the impact of incumbency. As Patterson and Caldeira note,
gubernatorial elections "offer a handsome focus for some analytical questions of basic interest" (1983, p. 687). In this case, they provide quasiautonomous jurisdictions, distinctive but stably bounded constituencies,
and sufficient numbers for comparative analysis. This allows us to examine three types of explanations offered for incumbents' advantages.
Only one advances clear claims to broader theoretical import, but all propose accounts of the factors favoring incumbents which appear to be
testable.
One explanation takes the form of a conjecture, focused on the accumulation of incumbents' advantages; in this view, as the governor
serves, experience and political capital accumulate, enhancing the incumbent's prospects in the next election. Paradoxically, other literature
argues that longer service in office is associated with increasing losses, as
grievances accumulate and political capital is expended. These con-
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trasting accounts yield conflicting predictions about the impact of continued gubernatorial service, which will be examined in the next section.
Two other explanations link incumbents' advantages to quite different
factors. The public choice literature appears to suggest that the expansion of public services, among its other impacts, provides incumbents
with more resources to use in enhancing their political prospects. If so,
incumbents' relative success should be linked to these changes. The third
explanation to be considered suggests that candidate-based appeals,
rather than structural features of the office, determine incumbents' fortunes.
These three explanations may not be mutually exclusive (that is, each
might contribute to the incumbency advantage, without reference to the
others), but they imply quite different concerns. If length of service contributes to incumbents' advantages, it can, if desired, be limited, as it is in
a number of states. If the expansion of the public sector is linked to this
growing advantage, conclusions may be drawn about the desirability of
this expansion. On the other hand, if candidate-based differences are involved, less manipulable factors are responsible (and concerns over this
growing advantage may be regarded as less warranted).
EXPLAINING INCUMBENCY

The Accumulation of Advantages (or Disadvantages?)
Conventional and political wisdom often maintains that incumbents
use the powers of their office to improve their initial political standing. At
its simplest, this argument implies that incumbents start from an
established baseline, enhancing their political position in subsequent elections. The initial results, reported in table 2, suggest that this is true,
since incumbents do indeed do better than successors. This argument
also appears to be consistent with Erickson's finding that incumbent
representatives gain, on the average, in their first reelection effort (1971)
and Born's finding that they also post gains in their second effort (1977),
while Alford and Hibbing (1981) argue that incumbents continue to
enhance their standing, albeit more slowly, in subsequent terms. Still,
Born and Erickson argue that no further gains emerge, and Turett (1971)
finds that many incumbents suffered declines in their margins of victory,
apparently contradicting this contention.
Additional analysis is needed to examine this finding in the gubernatorial context and to test the argument that incumbents are able to improve their standing in subsequent elections. The expected vote measure
outlined above can serve as an indicator of the baseline, so, if this
simplified argument is accurate, incumbents' short-term achievements in
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the previous election should be linked to those in subsequent elections. In
other words, successes in one election should provide the basis for continuing, mounting success subsequently (on the other hand, consider Alford
and Hibbing's results, 1981). Examining the correlation between the
short-term change in incumbents' previous elections with the short-term
change in the reelection result, we find that this is modestly true
(r = .319). (Turett's simpler measure, the margin of victory, provides a
somewhat stronger result, with r = .564; this is to be expected, since the
baseline expectation is confounded by this measure.) The result conceals,
however, an important period effect: in the first period, r = .464; in the
second period, r = .306; and in the third period, r = .127. In addition,
the linkage between gains in the last election and gains in this election is
stronger for Republicans than Democrats (r = .446 and .231, respectively). Thus, incumbents' ability to capitalize on previous successes was
modest in the 1950s, but it has waned to the point of being irrelevant since
then. 7
Much more specific hypotheses are sometimes offered regarding the
role of continuing service. These contend that incumbents use their service in office to amass political capital, enhance their personal standing,
enlist political supporters, and thwart potential opposition. If true, more
extended service should be associated with improved election results.
Alford and Hibbing (1981) report supportive findings, while Born's results
suggest that the advantages of service wane after the sophomore term
(1977, 1979).
On the other hand, as previously noted, the literature on organizational
theory proposes a symbolic role for the executive, who serves as a
handy —if not always carefully considered — focus for discontent.
Literature suggesting that voting is more powerfully shaped by retrospective assessment (Fiorina, 1981a) and/or by a relatively greater motivational force for discontent, the so-called negative voting model (Kernell,
7

Interestingly, surges in participation (as measured by the collateral measure of shortterm change in expected participation) in the incumbent's previous election are more strongly
related to the continuing change in participation in this election, with r = .479. This probably reflects important secular trends rather than incumbency effects. A model of causation
is implied by the relationships in question. Long-term participation has little relationship to
short-term changes in the incumbent's advantages (r = .049) and vice versa (r = .104).
Long-term participation and long-term levels of incumbent advantage are inversely related
(r = —.570), as are short-term changes in each (as noted, r = —.301). It suggests an unsurprising conclusion: less competitive elections are associated with lower participation, both
in the long term and in the short term. This is generally consistent with Patterson and
Caldeira's findings (1983), although measurement differences preclude direct comparisons.
See the report in appendix 2 on this point as well. The tie between the long-term levels of
participation and incumbent advantage has weakened over time, while the association between short-term advantages has varied (as we might expect, given the conception of these
measures).
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1977) is consistent with this alternative argument. It suggests that incumbency should be a disadvantage, particularly in times of discontent,
because the incumbent •will be blamed for the course of events in the state,
whether or not they can be controlled. If true, the longer a governor is in
office, the more these disadvantages accumulate, and the more electoral
support will erode.
A related account of these forces, drawn from the literature on
presidential popularity, is based on the so-called coalition of minorities
hypothesis. Dating back to Mueller's investigation of the linkage between Wars and presidential popularity (1973), declines in executive
popularity are predicted, other things being equal, over the incumbent's
tenure in office. These declines are based on the judgments of many
small but distinctive groups offended by particular decisions and indecisions, whose numbers accumulate, reducing the overall level of support.
Schlesinger offered a similar model to account for gubernatorial insecurity, suggesting that governors "accumulate grievances" rather than support as they continue in office (1966, pp. 68, 69; noted in Hinckley, 1970,
p. 842). These arguments imply, quite immediately, that the longer a
governor is in office, the more support will erode.
If true, governors holding office for a four-year term will have lost
more support than those holding office for two years. Further, those
seeking more than two terms will lose more support than those seeking a
second term in office. They also imply that participation will be
stimulated by the presence of a long-term incumbent, whose actions invigorate increasing numbers of opponents. The negative voting
hypothesis, in particular, ascribes greater motivational force to disaffection than to support and predicts higher turnouts among opponents
(Kernell, 1977, p. 60, "disapproval of the President's job performance is
associated with higher midterm turnout"). These arguments also require
the use of a measure of the deviation from expectations for their assessment, predicting that the deviations will be less favorable to incumbents
who have been in office longer. In table 3, the relevant evidence is
presented.
As the disaffection hypothesis predicts and as Alford and Hibbing's
findings (1981) would suggest, gubernatorial incumbents' relative shortterm gains, assessed against a measure of the expected division of the vote,
attenuate as they persist in office; this holds true for longer terms and for
those seeking additional terms.8 While participation is depressed in elec8

It might be argued that an artifact of the method has produced the latter result. Since it
is based on a moving average of outcomes, the expected division is increasingly composed of
earlier elections for that incumbent as more terms accumulate (and the result indicates that
surges in support subside). Artifice does not account for the other results predicted by the
same hypothesis, .since participation is stimulated by further terms (as the hypothesis would
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TABLE 3
SHORT-TERM ELECTORAL CHANGES IN GUBERNATORIAL
CONTESTS FOR TWO-YEAR AND FOUR-YEAR TERMS AND FIRST
FULL TERM, SECOND, THIRD, FOURTH, FIFTH, ETC. TERMS
AVERACE SHOBT-TERM CHANCES IN
T I M E IN OFFICE

INCUMBENT'S

MEASURE

(N)

Term of Office
Two Years
Four Years

(160)
(135)

1.857
.760*

.783
-1.574

(28)
(200)
(54)

-4.203*
2.368
.665

-.168
-.604
.550

Number of Terms
First Full Term*
Second Term
Third Term
Fourth, Fifth and
Sixth Term

(17)

VOTE PERCENTAGE

.506

PARTICIPATION

1.491

* Twenty-eight governors succeeded to office, without a regularly scheduled election;
twenty-five of them come from the same party as the incumbent, so they are treated as seeking a "first full term" as an incumbent. Three others come from the opposite party, seeking a
four-year term, so they are not included in calculations of the partisan division changes to
avoid confounding the impact of the departed incumbent with that of the new incumbent.
Four incumbents seeking three-year terms are excluded from the first part of the table.

tions involving first-term incumbents, it appears to be stimulated by an
incumbent's persistence; third- and subsequent-term elections are
associated with surges in participation. This, too, is consistent with the
disaffection hypothesis suggesting that opponents increase as service continues and that they are more likely to participate in subsequent elections.
Another result might be viewed as distinctive, but it can also be interpreted as support for the disaffection hypothesis: where a succeeding incumbent runs for a first full term (often produced by an incumbent
resigning to take a seat in the Senate or to move on to another office),
there are noticeable declines from the expected vote. This can reasonably
be attributed to the negative reactions these maneuvers often prompt. A
quite separate finding is that more frequently scheduled elections (that is,
two-year terms) appear to stimulate participation (compared to four-year
terms), a point which I have made elsewhere (Tompkins, 1981).

predict, but which methodological artifice would not have produced, by the same argument),
and a four-year term produces less gain than a two-year term (here, too, the hypothesis
predicts it, but artifice would produce a reversed result through the fewer number of elections
included). With a consistent pattern of results emerging, it is reasonable to discount the influence of this particular aspect of the method.
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These findings are similar to those of Alford and Hibbing on House incumbents (1981); a gubernatorial incumbent trying for a second term
does markedly better than expected, but in subsequent terms, further additions to support subside. Beyond that, this work suggests that participation is stimulated by such self-seeking. A two-facet mechanism appears to be at work. In the first term in office, gubernatorial incumbents
do have opportunities to advance their political fortunes; the impact of
these advantages is largely played out by the second term, and the
mobilization of discontent begins to affect the incumbent's political career
as governor. (Notice the greater increases associated with two-year terms
compared to four-year terms, suggesting that the resources of incumbency
can be deployed rather quickly, but the disadvantages of service mount in
only a few years.) This may provide another explanation for senatorial
vulnerability, based on their six-year term rather than on the apparently
suspect claim (based on the gubernatorial evidence) that senatorial
visibility is responsible for the differences. In general, only small further
gains in support emerge (this, too, is consistent with both Alford and Hibbing, and Born, since table 3 is focused on changes in support).
Nonetheless, the picture of secular declines in popularity may also be consistent with these findings —the longer a governor is in office, the more incumbency's advantage diminishes.
These findings present a mixed picture of incumbency, where the initial
advantages of office enhance electoral prospects while the accumulating
burdens detract from them. But no direct explanation is provided for the
results. One possible explanation is that asymmetries in voters' evaluations of incumbents produce the problem: blamed for bad tidings, less frequently rewarded for good news, the incumbent will ultimately lose some
of the initial advantages of office. These evaluations are presumably tied
to governors' abilities to affect the course of state government; the more
resources the governors control, and the more power they have over such
resources, the more able the incumbents are to influence electoral rewards
and sanctions (or, perhaps, the more vulnerable they are).
Bureaucratic Resources?
This commonly offered explanation for the advantage of legislative incumbency is most clearly expressed within a public choice perspective. A
simplified account suggests that Congress establishes new programs,
which individual incumbents, as rational actors seeking reelection, claim
credit for obtaining. These expanded public commitments are only
generally shaped, leaving specific applications to bureaucratic initiative
and discretion. The process of translating general commitments into formal rules and procedures creates grievances and difficulties; legislators
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then offer their services as ombudsmen. In this process, incumbent
legislators are able to claim credit for new public services, to offer redress
and succor to those affected by bureaucratic elaborations of these new
commitments (thus shielding legislators from responsibility), and finally,
to deplore the results of this process by attributing it to institutional rather
than personal factors (see Fiorina, 1977a, 1977b).
Extensive and controversial testing of some elements of this argument
has been taking place in legislative studies. In particular, a number of
studies have examined the influence of legislative casework services and
other contacts coming through newsletters, "baby books," and the like
(for example, Johannes and McAdams, 1981; McAdams and Johannes,
1983; Fiorina, 1981b; and Cover and Brumberg, 1982). Nonetheless, the
conjecture also includes the hypothesis that incumbency effects are linked
to improved opportunities for porkbarreling (See Fiorina, 1977a, p. 180;
1977b, pp. 41-42, 44, 46, 48, and Appendix). Less attention has been
paid to this part of the argument. Two factors account for the neglect:
As Alford and Hibbing (1981) point out, at the federal level, growth has
been relatively constant, while the incumbency effect appears to have
emerged more abruptly. Moreover, they rule out generational accounts
of incumbency effects which might otherwise be linked to federal government growth.
Hirschman (1982) offers an essentially contradictory prediction. In his
account, expanded public services inflate expectations about the contribution these services will make to public happiness. These expectations are disappointed, leading to disillusionment and withdrawal from
public activity. For an incumbent politician, this frustration might be
expected to have negative consequences, while the accompanying
withdrawal may depress participation.
Governors appear to offer a useful setting for the examination of these
contrasting arguments both of which suggest that incumbency's advantage is tied to the growth in public services. Unlike members of Congress,
they face diverse constituencies, with state services elaborated at substantially different levels and during different time periods. Perhaps even
more directly, governors, as political executives, are held responsible for
the general activities of state government; and, at the same time, they,
too, serve as ombudsmen and service delivery agents for their constituents. Indeed, the role may be sharpened for them.
A series of simple tests offers little comfort for either position. The
relationship between bureaucratization and incumbency effects should be
positive if the picture of self-interested incumbents using public sector
growth as a mechanism to improve reelection prospects is accurate; it
should be negative if Hirschman's dashed-expectations hypothesis is accurate (and participation should be reduced). The purest measure of
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state government size appears to be the number of (full-time equivalent)
state employees, which avoids confounding states' wealth and other exogenous features with the core issue of bureaucratization.9 This measure
of size is essentially unrelated to short-term changes in incumbents' fortunes (measured as above, r = — .032). Removing the influence of state
size by using a per capita employment measure and thus measuring
bureaucratization, does not improve matters much (r = .143). We
might object to these static tests, but a test of the relationship between
growth in employment and changes in support fares no better
(r = — .029; an adjustment for yearly growth does not change the situation, r = .019). Hirschman's withdrawal hypothesis fares even worse,
since changes in state employment are positively associated with shortterm improvements in participation (for yearly change in employment,
r = .257).
The picture of self-enhancing incumbent activity rests on the presumption that governors control public activity in the states. Perhaps, then,
public attributions of responsibility (and therefore their sanctions at the
polls) are influenced by gubernatorial control over state activity. Here,
too, there is substantial interstate variability (Beyle and Dalton, 1981;
Dometrius, 1979), making this a more sensitive focus for a test of this
claim. These powers also shape the governor's ability to allocate rewards
and punishments, so they play a role in any porkbarreling behavior, implying a direct link to the larger public-choice explanation of incumbency
effects. Neither overall gubernatorial power, measured by Dometrius's
index, nor its components (appointment powers and budgetary powers),
are related to changes in electoral fortunes or to participation (for shortterm changes in votes, r = — .041, — .027, and — .060, respectively; for
participation changes, r = .001, .041, and —.113).
These null findings cast substantial doubts on one portion of the
"bureaucracy did it" account of incumbency's advantage. While they say
nothing about changes in incumbents' behavior, or about the influence of
changes in staff composition (or its use), they do cast doubt on the
hypothesized tie between the growth in the public sector and incumbents'
improving fortunes. A more statistically persuasive test would incorporate these explanations into fully elaborated models of gubernatorial
election outcomes; lacking both fully established models and measures of
some key factors influencing all of these elections —consider, for example,
campaign spending (Patterson, 1982) —such a test is impossible for now.
In appendix 2, a simple multivariate exploration of the factors examined
9
Turett reports a related analysis, examining the relationship of expenditure effort with
vote margins, finding no relationship (1971, p. 120). The measure appears objectionable on
the noted grounds. Data on full-time equivalent state employment first become available in
1954 (except in Connecticut, where it is not reported until the following biennium).
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here, using OLS regression, is reported; its value is limited by uncertainties about model identification and the related problem of specifications
of causal priority. The literature is not particularly helpful in these matters, in part because a dynamic model, predicting changes in outcomes, is
involved. (The problems are explained in more detail in Hanushek and
Jackson, 1977, pp. 246-50.)
This exploratory effort suggests that important period effects are involved. In the first period (1947-59), the variables involved have little
predictive success; the greater success in the second period (1960-69)
wanes in the third period (1970-81). In the second period, public sector
expansion is associated with stimulated participation, and by the third
period, bureaucratization appears to be linked to improved incumbent
fortunes. Gubernatorial power appears to play little role in influencing
electoral prospects throughout this period.
While their ultimate value is suggestive, these analyses are useful for
several reasons. Interstate and intrastate differences in bureaucratization are considered, while incumbents' performance is measured through
their ability to improve on a locally developed baseline. Since measures
of political and bureaucratic change are employed, a dynamic model is
assessed. Finally, state executives are clearly visible and their performance (and, therefore, its electoral consequences) should be tied directly to
changes in governmental activity. The very limited support we find for
the "enhance the bureaucracy/enhance the incumbent" proposition raises
a number of issues. Apart from the period effects which appear to be involved (on the basis of limited evidence), the findings also suggest that the
mechanism involved in these conjectures requires further elaboration. At
the very least, we probably need to distinguish between political executives and legislators — perhaps it also raises new doubts about the importance of these explanations for the emergence of the incumbency advantage in the 1960s.
Do the Best Succeed?
A quite different, and simple conjecture about incumbents' advantages
suggests that their performance in office will influence electoral outcomes. The better their performance, the more successful they will be in
seeking reelection. While we have no data on good members of Congress, save for the occasional effort to identify the "ten dumbest"
members, Sabato has reported a systematic effort to identify the
"outstanding" governors from 1950 to 1975 (1978). While this reputational exercise must be viewed as hazardous,10 it does provide us with a
10

A number of concerns can be raised about this classification effort: it is essentially impressionistic, with no effort made to assure its replicability. Consider the criteria Sabato of-
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measure of success in office, developed outside the analysis performed
here. Unfortunately, it may also reflect political success as an implicit
standard of achievement and thus be essentially circular. For example,
Sigelman and Smith (1981) were only modestly successful in attempting to
predict a governor's reputation using background and structural
variables. Still, other things being equal, we might hope that successful
incumbents do well at the polls, while less successful governors do less
well.
Sabato's effort identifies 117 governors as outstanding (37.5 percent of
those he examined) and further distinguishes the twelve most outstanding.
Many served in states where reelection was not permitted at the time,
while others' primary service came in earlier years. Our test of the
"rewards of performance" proposition then is limited to those governors
seeking election between 1950 and 1974, comparing the fortunes of all
those elected with those seeking reelection, and comparing the reelection
fortunes of those identified as outstanding with the remainder regarded as
less outstanding.
These results suggest that outstanding governors fare better at the polls.
Compared with the remainder, merely outstanding governors appear to
achieve gains of about 4 percent above the expected level of support,
while those Sabato considers to be the most distinguished of all do more
than a percentage point better than that. There is some small decrease in
participation associated with the most successful governors, suggesting
that they may be the beneficiaries of voters' complacency. This is largely
a test of the link (not necessarily causal) between external reputation and
political success, but it does at least suggest that outstanding reputations
are related to political success.
CONCLUSION

The analysis of gubernatorial incumbents' fortunes is dominated by the
fers, which he draws from Kallenbach: "a governor should be evaluated on his ability as a
judge of men, ability to make hard decisions and assume responsibility, political sensitivity
and timing, political audacity and zest for combat, ability to inspire confidence and loyalty,
sense of proportion and perspective, and ability to withstand unfair criticism" (Sabato, 1978,
p. 53). While the partisan composition of the governors identified as outstanding is fortuitously balanced, the selection process appears to favor activist styles. Consider the statement, "As one source consulted for this study commented when asked his opinion of a prominent Border state governor: 'He's outstanding, even if a crook' " (Sabato, 1978, p. 54).
Nonetheless, it does appear to include most of those governors generally viewed as most
capable. Objections to it suggest that, at the worst, it represents a modest test of the rewards
of virtue. More critically, it may have elements of a self-fulfilling prophecy, since outstanding governors may achieve their reputation through political, and therefore electoral success,
rather than through other aspects of their job performance. Thus this is a weak test of the
hypothesis.
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TABLE 4
SHORT-TERM CHANGES AFFECTING GUBERNATORIAL CONTESTS
FOR INCUMBENT'S ELECTIONS BY SABATO'S REPUTATIONAL RANKING

REPUTATION, OF
INCUMBENT

(N)'

Most Outstanding Incumbents
Outstanding Incumbents
Other Incumbents

(14)
(106)
(123)

SHOHT-TERM CHANCES IN
INCUMBENT'S
VOTE PERCENTAGE
PARTICIPATION

5.141
4.167
-.308*

-.606
.130
.553

* Each election is considered separately, two other incumbent elections involve cases
where a candidate of the other party takes office before a regularly scheduled election — so the
number of cases considered in this instance is two less than the number considered in measuring participation changes.

process of secular change. Competition stimulates participation, while
uneventful contests retard it. The 1960s appear to have been a critical
period for governors, as it was for members of the U.S. House, although
this work does not resolve the debate over the cause of the changes which
emerge. Still, an incumbency advantage is nothing new for governors;
they benefit from the general fortunes of their party (since that shapes
their prospects), but they also have done better than successor candidates
in this modern era. Incumbency appears to involve two forces at odds
with each other: the initial advantages which come with the office, improving their prospects, and the subsequent burdens associated with service, which stimulate participation and erode the incumbents' abilities to
enhance their standings. Public choice explanations for the impact of incumbency require further analysis; it seems clear that relative advantages
in gubernatorial power make no difference, and that the growth of the
public sector is linked to some gains in participation (perhaps contrary to
Hirschman's expectation). Bureaucratization may now play some role in
enhancing incumbents' prospects, but this is a recent phenomenon, if
true; it does not account for the important changes in incumbents' advantages in the 1960s. Other findings underscore the importance of
candidate-based forces (such as the gains achieved by Sabato's outstanding governors). They also suggest that much remains to be explained,
since the comprehensive, if exploratory model of the factors associated
with electoral change is only modestly successful at predicting these
changes.
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APPENDIX 1:
T H E TREATMENT OF GUBERNATORIAL ELECTORAL SERIES

The problem of disentangling long-term patterns and short-term changes from them poses
a number of difficulties when tackled using only aggregated election return data. Some of
these are insurmountable, such as the level-of-analysis problem (requiring the development of
measures that presumably have an individual-level analog using only aggregate data). I have
argued elsewhere (Tompkins, 1980) that a relatively simple approach can be employed to perform a decomposition of an electoral series that is generally satisfactory for the purposes of
identifying meaningful long-term and short-term components in an election series. While
gubernatorial elections pose greater difficulties for other methodologies, based on curvefitting algorithms, they are easily treated within this framework.
The first problem that such series pose is the off-year to on-year cycle —presumably in the
years in which presidents are elected there is some surge in the number and character of the
participants. To account for this, the series can be seasonally adjusted —in this case, by
deflating on-year elections by a measure of this surge. The simplest approach, the difference
between mean on-year levels and mean off-year levels, also appears to be the most satisfactory. Since a major realignment is generally regarded as emerging in the early 1930s, these
differences are best calculated over the post-1932 period, avoiding confusion with the realignment process and the infusion of women into the electorate. Accordingly, where states have
both on-year and off-year elections, the level of participation and the percentage vote for
Democratic candidates are seasonally adjusted by this process. In five states — Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, New Jersey, and New York — changes in gubernatorial terms affect the results
of this adjustment, since the differences would be attributed to a few unusual elections (for example, Illinois changed from on-year to off-year elections in 1978), so the election results are
not adjusted for these cases. The Democratic vote share is used for a measure of the partisan
division since it involves less fluctuation from decisions to offer a candidate in particular elections and from independent candidacies.
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This adjusted data series must then be partitioned into its long-term component (roughly a
measure of a normal vote) and its short-term component (roughly a measure of the electionspecific forces involved). Notice that we are interested in breaking down a current election
result into these two distinctive components, not in forecasting a subsequent result. Two
polar strategies can be identified: one would attempt to fit the series with a time-series function (such as of the ARIMA family), using past information to approximate most closely the
current election result, while the other would use long-ranging historical averages as measures
of the long-term component, leaving remaining variation to be attributed to more transitory
forces. The first strategy confuses transitory electoral forces which persist for an election or
two (and would normally be regarded as short-term features) with more durable
characteristics of the partisan division. Apart from that, estimation of such a function proves
to be an ambiguous enterprise with these series, rendering any results suspect. The second
strategy is far too insensitive to the evolutionary processes characterizing political change in
recent years.
Accordingly, a strategy that amounts to an intermediate approach is employed: a twelveyear-backcast moving average measure, including the current value, is computed for each
point in the series. This value is treated as the long-term component of the election outcome,
presumably attributable to the underlying partisan division, while the remainder is treated as
the short-term component, a measure of immediate election forces. The year-based backcast
overcomes the problems produced by unequal timing of gubernatorial elections (which are
set, nonetheless, in a larger electoral system with predictable timing). The twelve-year
frame best satisfies the order condition which we would impose — balancing the variation incorporated into the remaining short-term change measure with the degree of stability captured by the long-term measure. (Eight years or less hardly seems to produce a long-term
measure, but sixteen years leaves a substantial persisting element attributed to the short-term
component.)
Thus, each election result (with the Democratic vote share and participation examined
separately) is subjected to the following process to produce the measures used here. Within
each state, the seasonal adjustment value is subtracted from the Democratic vote share and
the participation proportion in each on-year election, while off-year elections are used as is;
these values are treated as the seasonally adjusted election results. They are then broken
down into the long-term component (a twelve-year moving average of results, including the
current election and cast back twelve years — thereby including at least four elections' values
in the result) and a short-term component (the difference between the seasonally adjusted outcome and the long-term component).
The consequences of this procedure are examined in more detail in Tompkins (1980). It
should be noted that Piereson (1977) also uses what he calls "a floating average." He uses a
four-year span, which appears to be insufficient to produce a long-term measure and which
introduces variations attributable to presidential-year surges in participation and interest. He
employs a measure that is properly not a "floating average," but rather a "floating
minimum," to set his baseline — this is unlikely to reflect accurately the baseline where
substantial ticket-splitting takes place (and, indeed, his finding of greater advantage in the
1960s may well be attributable to a baseline lowered by increasing ticket-splitting). Finally,
he uses national legislative offices (Senate and House) to establish this baseline, but this requires a problematic assumption that national- and state-level politics are inevitably intermixed. This assumption is particularly troublesome in off-years, since governors are the most
visible officials standing for election then (see Sabato, 1978, p. 8, for a review of some
evidence). Since many states have moved to off-year gubernatorial elections, this point appears to be more important in recent years. This separability renders any standardization
process which uses national elections suspect. (Turett, 1971, presents some evidence on
separability of state and national elections consistent with this argument, for much of the
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period under study here; Hinckley, 1970, also provides some mixed evidence on the distinctiveness of senatorial and gubernatorial elections, particularly in off-years.) Finally, if we inspect the mean level of short-term change produced by this new measure, we find that variations among the states, in any given year, are far more substantial than variations in the mean
level of change over the years. This, too, suggests that intrastate differences dominate national variations from one year to the next. It is important to note that this procedure is conceptually related to Patterson's use of 1956-76 gubernatorial election results to produce a
baseline measure of partisanship; other background work on the method employed here
(Tompkins, 1980) suggests that he has considered an unnecessarily long span (reducing the
ability to explain immediate election results) and has confounded his results by not adjusting
data for surges in participation and partisanship associated with presidential years. The
methods employed here are closely related to those employed by Hopkins and Lyons (1980),
Flanigan and Zingale (1980), and Hofstetter (1973) as well.

APPENDIX 2: A PRELIMINARY MULTIVARIATE ASSESSMENT

The bivariate assessments of the major explanations for the incumbency effect which are
included in the text are troublesome in several ways. Most important, they risk confusing
parallel secular changes, treating spurious relationships as important. So, for example,
gubernatorial elections have become more competitive while the public sector has grown; it
may be that these trends are unrelated, but any measure of association will reflect their correlation over the time periods involved (or, since little relationship appears in the bivariate
case, it may reflect the net effect of a positive causal tie between the two, but a negative
association between the secular trends in each variable).
The most statistically desirable approach would involve the development and estimation
of a model of the various forces influencing incumbents' abilities to improve on their baseline
expectations. This model would reflect intertwined causality (that is, for example, our belief
that short-term changes in voting shares and in participation are mutually related), the ordering of various explanatory forces, and the full array of significant influences on these outcomes. We lack models to inform the ordering; we lack data on key variables influencing
outcomes, such as, for example, campaign spending —as in Patterson's investigation of 1978
elections (1982) —and we lack a broader theoretical backdrop which could inform the process. As a result, this assessment is not feasible.
Still, some preliminary results bear review. A simple exploratory strategy involves the
estimation of relative importance of each factor considered, using OLS regression. Multicollinearity among some of these factors may cloud parameter estimates. The equations
are generally unimpressive at predicting results, but this is due, in part, to a demanding
task: unlike.some predictions of election outcomes, long-term components of the electoral
series have been extracted, leaving only short-term components to be explained. Whatever
stochastic error remains is incorporated in the latter component, much as it is in a difference
equation model, so the feasible predictive performance of these equations is probably lower
than in other such cases. (Patterson's work is an example of a case where this year's overall
vote is predicted using previous votes, so, in effect, he predicts the net effect of the expected
vote plus changes from it. See 1982, p. 466.) Finally, this analysis explores factors influencing incumbents' relative success, considered separately; the first section of the paper should be
consulted for an estimate of the magnitude of an overall incumbency effect (incumbents compared to successor candidates).
Table 5 reports parameter estimates for the cases in question. We have already seen
evidence suggesting period effects in these cases, so separate equations are estimated for our
three periods.
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